Abstract. Our paper takes as its starting point the premise that elections are central moments in the life of polities: these are the times when individual citizens demonstrate support or otherwise of political institutions and regimes, assess their accountability and set agendas for the next government. In short, elections allow us to observe whether and how political regimes live up to society's expectations. This issue has particular resonance in deeply divided societies that have experienced ethnic confl ict in the past. In the deeply divided society of Kosovo, local and national elections in 2013 and 2014 presented an opportunity to analyze voter choices and elite agendas, with the presence of ethnopolitical issues under scrutiny. Our paper concludes that the normalization of electoral politics, within the context of European aspirations, has not yet taken place in Kosovo, and that the options available to the electorate continue to be dominated by identity politicking.
Over the past 25 years, the region aff ected by the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has seen content of political debate linked considerably to ethnic identity issues. This resulted in interethnic violence, emergence of ethnocentric nation-building projects, and centrifugal institutional politics. Following a long period of ethno-political gestation among Albanian-speakers, violence between the Albanian minority in southern Serbia and Serbian security forces, the war in Kosovo and particularly the NATO bombings in March 1999, Kosovo declared independence in 2008, supported by many Western states. Since then, the international community has maintained a large, although gradually diminishing, institutional presence in the country. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which governed immediately following the NATO intervention in 1999, was replaced in 2008 by the more technical and advisory European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Both missions were established with the intentions of democracy promotion, to foster democratic institution-building and the empowerment of democratic political actors, as well as to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for democratisation. 1 However, the vision that eventual full executive powers would be transferred to Kosovo state institutions was delivered in a top-down manner from the European organisations through cooperation with domestic political elites.
Despite Kosovo's pursuit of fully recognized statehood, the status of the territory has remained contested by Serbia and much of the Serb majority residing in northern Kosovo. 2 If anything, this points out the limitations of a narrow vision of democracy promotion, in part att ested to the EU, and underlines the importance of elections and safeguarding political liberties. Indeed, some observers argue that though legitimizing new political institutions and democratic political process via citizen participation at the ballot box, such an approach highlights the pivotal role of civil rights for all state citizens for meaningful participation in politics. As such, regular and competitive elections are simply not enough to usher in and normalize democratic politics in the absence of consensus about the benefi ciaries of the democratic process. 3 The importance of Kosovo's status and administrative boundaries for Serb majority municipalities means that despite their overall size in the territory of Kosovo, issues of ethnoregional representation directly impact on policies of the new state, and at times directly challenge the notion that Kosovo citizenship is inclusive of all ethnic groups.
In this regard, Kosovo elections are paramount events in the life of the new democratic state, established with an immense international assistance. Holding of elections in post-confl ict, deeply divided society is often less about the everyday issues of municipal governance, such as healthcare provision and education, and more as a test for the sustainability of political institutions. 2 Throughout the text we use 'Serb' to refer to members of the Serb minority community in Kosovo (who self-identify as 'Serbs', similar to those communities in Bosnia and Croatia). This is denoting the 'ethnic group', as is the term 'Albanian' in this article. We are aware of the fact that in the context of ethnically divided and post-confl ict societies in the Western Balkans 'Serbian' is used more commonly to refer to actors and institutions of the state of Serbia. In our case study of Kosovo, this would imply a reference to another state. Whilst we are cognisant of the fact that the reference to 'Kosovo Serb' is more widely accepted, this can be (and has been) interpreted by some as implying allegiance to or support for Kosovo statehood by those Serbs, which is misleading. Moreover, whereas reference to 'Kosovo Serbs' would be more appropriate than 'Serbian', we would also need to amend all use of the word 'Albanian' to become 'Kosovo Albanian' too. Although municipal elections were held in 2009 and parliamentary elections in 2010, the Serb community in the north of Kosovo boycott ed both. Att empts to solicit Serb participation in Kosovo institutional structures have been made through the European Union-brokered normalization dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade since 2010, which sought to resolve the issue of parallel governance of Kosovo's Serb majority municipalities supported by Belgrade, particularly in the Mitrovica North, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić municipalities north of the River Ibar. This led to the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations, known as the Brussels Agreement, signed by both Kosovo and Serbia, which facilitates the participation of the Serb majority municipalities in local elections, and also provides for the formation of an Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM) following successful local elections.
The signifi cance of the Serb minority's participation, and the support that this had from the Serbian government in both the 2013 and 2014 elections demonstrates that the contests involved competition for ethnic votes. While society in Kosovo is still divided over understandings of state ownership and the direction of the nation-state building, the two elections we discuss in this paper hardly allow observers to see them as foundational moments in the functioning of Kosovo as a multi-ethnic democratic state. As the impact of ethnic issues in electoral campaigns is a widely used indicator in post-communist area studies, 4 we hypothesize that in the context of diff erent experiences of ethnic groups with political institutions and political leadership, the perceived eff ects of the European Union integration on the building of domestic institutions have not been delinked from ethnic politicking in electoral process. By scrutinizing the case of Kosovo, the main research question we ask addresses the existence of a correlation between levels of ethnopolitical mobilization and successful political entrepreneurs' capitalization of these agendas after the elections. Thus, our focus is on the impact of ethnic cleavage on the viability of electoral politics for both of the main ethnic groups in Kosovo, and we ascertain that any shift from group-based preferences aff ects the electorate's behavior in electoral politics in this young European democracy. As the ethnonational divide dominated the debates and election outcomes in Kosovo, we spell out issues that have prevented the 'normalization' of electoral politics and allowed identities to comfortably dominate the background of all political deliberations.
Democratization and State-Building in Divided Societies
A classic political science argument says that a political system becomes institutionally democratic with the installation of competitive elections and multiple political parties. 5 However, it remains incomplete until an overwhelming majority of the elected representatives unconditionally support democratic procedures, play by the rules of the democratic game and are accountable to all citizens of the state. 6 Both the scholarly community and policy circles recognize that what political elites make of democratic institutions and institutional opportunity structures is a key component of what makes democracy work. 7 Therefore, electoral politics refl ect the process in which individual citizens partake in order to achieve specifi c outcomes, and are hard to imagine without their instrumental value, endorsing contenders' ability to shape the more hands-on, practical solution to individual preferences. 8 The literature on electoral politics also makes clear that this multi-layered phenomenon is in place-and most often, likely to stay-not only because of political actors, but also because the electorate shape politics as both a normative and practical political process. 9 Many scholars regard the unconditional institutionalization of democracy when candidates and, later, representatives principally decide and act on an issue, and not identity, basis to ensure their electoral success. 10 On the other hand, the eff ectiveness of an electoral system based on levels of inclusion of multiple social cleavages, into policy making is particularly important in societies rigged by deep cleavages as well as in post-confl ict conditions. 11 Here, political representatives accountable to a narrowly defi ned electorate, be it regional, socioeconomic, or ethnocultural groups, tend to import clientelist relations into the forum of political decision making and impede successful normalization of politics. 12 This is particularly important as democratizing political systems are more prone to crisis, and only those representatives committ ed to accountability to their segmented electorate are likely to survive electoral cycles in the democratic regimes. 13 There is a broad agreement across studies of electoral politics that inclusion of interests of social, economic and ethnocultural minority groups is essential for consolidation of democratic politics. 14 Inclusion of all segments of the population is particularly important in the context of promoting and guaranteeing civil and political rights for all parts of the citizenry. Importantly, addressing social and economic inequalities in Central and Eastern European societies after the end of the communist regimes has been central to addressing electorates' view of politics as a democratic process where rules of the game can be renegotiated. Though some have criticized the view that competition drives national agendas in electoral processes, 15 most scholars agree that an ethnic security dilemma reinforces boundaries between ethnic groups that spill over into the democratic political process. 16 To this eff ect John Paul Lederach states that 'people, when threatened, seek security in narrower, more localized [ethnic or religious] identity groups', 17 reducing the resources of non-dominant elites and motiving ethnopolitical mobilization to central authorities.
However, the earlier hopes of a gradual conversion of electoral politics in the post-communist region with those observed in the more established democracies, have failed to materialize. Across ethnically divided post-communist societies, levels of ethnopolitical mobilization remain high and political parties continue to galvanize electorates by talking up the issues of perceived diff erence in rights and opportunities of ethnic groups. We therefore need to ask ourselves, whether the post-communist condition per se, or a more narrow set of factors, such as ethnic division of societies, volatility of electoral politics, and unresolved claims to scarce political and socioeconomic resources of the state have prevented the 'normalization' of electoral politics in ethnically divided societies. Throughout the post-communist history, ownership over institutions of the state has been contested and redesigned to be exclusive and to serve best the culturally-distinct peoples seeking self-determination. 18 We do not see ethnopolitical mobilization of non-dominant groups in emerging democracies as an 'intoxicating brew, leading in case after case to illconceived wars of expansion'. 19 More to the point, Mark Bessinger claims that ethnonationalism might have a positive eff ect on democratization when nondominant groups mobilize against outright disempowerment and side-lining in democratic politics, hence aiding democratic process. 20 This observation has informed Andreas Wimmer et al. to suggest that non-dominant ethnicities are more likely to engage in open confl ict with a democratizing state than with any other non-democratic regime. 21 Thus, including minority representatives in political decision-making allows for disputes over the remit of minority participation in political process to become an adequate component of electoral politics, rather than a reason to resort to interethnic strife and violence.
Donald Horowitz ' Ethnic Groups in Confl ict suggests that multiple ethnic groups threaten to derail democratization because identity determines the distribution of important material and nonmaterial goods. 22 26 Paying att ention to the 'confi guration of power' and avenues available to diff erent groups to access and participate in political institutions, to share power eff ectively distinguishes pathways for democratic consolidation. Since Arendt Lijphart's description of the most eff ective mechanisms for governing divided societies, 'power-sharing' has been the popular recipe for making political entrepreneurs of contending groups cooperate. 27 As in many cases across the globe, including Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iraq, consociationalist arrangements have been put into practice when designing constitutional futures of divided post-confl ict societies. Though Lijphart's early works see 'culturally divided' societies as the object of political engineering, contemporary prophets of consociationalism John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary point out that ethnic identities are distinct from those chosen in electoral politics and underlying the system of political representation. 28 It is a more fl uid view of identity that anticipates an increased interaction and eventual retreat of identities from politicking. 29 Yet in a political process that forces citizens to rank-order their choices among diff erent candidates on the ballot paper, 'political and social organizations founded on ethnic belonging rather than on individual choice' have barely succeeded in managing ethnic 23 confl ict. 30 As a result polities operating on the basis of power-sharing exacerbate ethnic cleavages in divided post-confl ict societies. 31 Unsurprisingly therefore, Wimmer et al. see ethnic exclusion in politics as one of the main drivers of ethnic confl ict. 32 When political structures provide litt le opportunity for participation and limited space for nonviolent pursuit of goals for political entrepreneurs of non-dominant groups, we are indeed very likely to see entrenchment of 'tribal politics' in democratic electoral processes. 33 Timothy Sisk further claims that no matt er how democratic political procedures are, simple majority rule is badly suited for institutional change and does not bid well for democratic stability, resulting in mobilization of non-dominant groups. 34 Wolfgang Merkel and Brigitt e Weiff en further refi ne this argument by analyzing third wave democracies, concluding that political institutions, alongside principles and procedures of the new political regime, help to inscribe intergroup equality into the fabric of electoral politics in the newly democratizing states, and make democratic consolidation possible even in the most heterogeneous societies. 35 Ominously, Richard Rose and William Mishler proclaimed that post-communist publics value democracy not for what it is, but rather for what it is not. 36 Looking into the details of the 2013 municipal as well as the 2014 Assembly elections in Kosovo will allow us to assess the degree of ethnic politicking and clientelism in electoral politics in this country. Probing deeper into discourses preceding the elections and focusing on preferences of elected politicians, we are able to identify what diff erent ethnic segments in Kosovo society favor in this new democracy, and what they do not.
Dynamics in Politics and the Importance of Elections
Citizens of post-communist states had lifelong experience of undemocratic rule prior to the break-up of communist regimes, and many of them remain att ached to the mind-set of the earlier however authoritarian, yet at all times 30 undemocratic, regimes. 37 Yet in view of the importance of opportunities opened after the start of the democratic transition, preferences for political participation in decision-making among publics should not be equated with unconditional or unwavering pursuit of collective good. 38 Some of these same phenomena have been observed in divided societies, particularly as tantamount to support of ethnic clientelism. Support for democracy is often believed to refl ect the psychologically loose att achment citizens have to the positive symbols of democracy, such as sovereignty over territory and self-determination of its peoples. Citizens of new democracies assess the new political regime in which they fi nd themselves by not only, or rather not mainly, estimating favorable democratic ideals and practices they experience. Litt le experience and limited sophistication of the workings of democratic politics are found to make participation in the political process driven by uncertainty over whether democracy or any other political regime off ers satisfying solutions to the many problems facing societies. Under such uncertainty, citizens who are democratic novices often embrace both democratic and authoritarian political propensities concurrently, and participation in democratic politics does not necessarily mean rejection of authoritarianism or vice versa. 39 With these dynamics in mind, our main research question addresses the existence of a correlation between levels of ethnopolitical mobilization and successful political entrepreneurs' capitalization of these agendas after the elections. 40 Overall, fi ndings on this link will allow for a qualifi ed statement on the 'normalization' of electoral politics in ethnically divided societies in particular, and the impact of ethnopolitical cleavages on the process of democratization in general. 41 More broadly, we will be able to conclude whether political processes and electoral politics in post-confl ict societies have a similar impact on support for democracy as an ideal form of regime as had been previously demonstrated in other countries. 42 Our working hypothesis is that in new democratic political sett ings, the high level of commitment to ethnopolitical mobilization is associated with low levels of normalization of electoral politics and continuous support for ethnopolitical rhetoric.
Yet at a more fundamental level, post-communist societies historically have had low levels of trust in politicians, political institutions and, compared to countries with a longer period of uninterrupted democratic rule, have been more reluctant to participate in any kind of political activity, including elections. 43 There has been one notable exception to this rule: where concerns for ethnic identity have formed a strong motivation to forge political alliances these regularly bring citizens to the ballot box. Particularly in ethnically divided and post-confl ict societies, social and political cleavages between ethnic segments of electorate are often eff ectively reframed to att ract electoral support and ensure stable political alliance during the electoral cycles. The resulting landscapes of electoral politics witnesses a perceptible shift towards political parties capitalizing on ethnic, rather than social, cleavages and fostering political rhetoric that mobilizes ethnic electorate. 44 The literature on ethnically divided societies makes clear that once incentives are in place for political representatives to cater exclusively for ethnic constituencies, forging political alliances to bridge the ethnic divide becomes extremely diffi cult. 45 Furthermore, higher levels of political salience, expressed diff erences in cultural markers and deeper diff erences of group experiences in the past, make it more diffi cult for the electorate to realign expectations from their political representatives in post-confl ict societies. This evolution runs against the grain of electoral politics in Western European democracies and across much of the EU, which is leading post-confl ict reconstruction, and overseeing state-building in the states of the Western Balkans. Two states in the Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, have a unique dynamic in electoral party politics, particularly where success in political reform is connected to the prospect of the EU membership. The prospect is ever more pertinent since societies in these states maintain several social axes, including ethnicity and language, and spectrums of winners and losers of transition. Previously, much att ention has been given to electoral politics in post-confl ict societies with analysis from the point of view of consolidation. However, few have analyzed electoral politics using the perspective of divided societies and none through the focus on crucial points in the life of democracies, the election, to signpost the abatement of, if not the normalization in, ethnic politicking.
We have chosen Kosovo as a country case, because a range of comparative and longitudinal research on democratization, role of parties and politicization of identities demonstrates high volatility in terms of political stability and ethnic politicking in this country. 46 This is despite the widespread involvement of the EU and international organizations in developing the democratic hardware in the country and sponsoring, by a variety of means, the eff ective installation of democratic software with its political elites.
Electoral Study: Local Elections in Kosovo
The 2013 local elections for municipal mayors and assembly members cannot be understood independently of the circumstances in which Kosovo became a political entity. Successful execution of municipal elections in all thirty-eight municipalities was anticipated as an indicator for confi dence in the government's ability to conduct democratic processes across the entire territory, and the development of Kosovo as a democratic, multiethnic state. Furthermore, the participation of Serb parties and voters, facilitated in northern municipalities by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was sought as an output of the Pristina-Belgrade normalization process, and an implemented provision of the Brussels Agreement. Widespread Serb participation was also anticipated as a minority endorsement for forming a decentralized body, the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM), which was also an agreed provision in the Brussels Agreement and would increase the degree of ethnic decentralization in Kosovo, whilst bringing the Northern municipalities into the fold. 47 Minority Serb ethnic parties in Mitrovica North, Leposavić, Zvečan and Zubin Potok municipalities, had consistently resisted previous att empts by international actors to integrate the north into Kosovo institutions, and boycott ed all elections held in Kosovo since its independence. 48 This prospective electoral mobilization meant that the participation of minority ethnic parties, and the mechanisms of facilitating this, became a divisive ethno-political issue among representatives of both majority and minority parties throughout the campaign.
Positions of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and their election campaigns, particularly regarding issues of ethnic inclusion, minority participation, and ownership of institutions, can be examined through the lens of ethnic majority and minority parties. It can also focus on parties appealing to the majority ethnic community (Albanians), and the numerically largest minority (Serbs), although ethnic parties representing members of Bosniak, Roma, Gorani, Ashkali, Egyptian and other communities also competed. The reasons for this analytical division are twofold. Firstly, almost all candidates adhered to ethnic cleavage by appealing exclusively to their ethnolinguistic communities, using monolingual media channels to communicate with voters. 49 Secondly, majority and minority parties postured themselves in an outbidding process against co-ethnic parties when either criticising the record of their competitors, or making claims about minority governance issues.
Majority, ethnic-Albanian, party campaigning over identity issues prior to the election promulgated the following concerns: facilitation of minority voting; integration of the Serb minority through institutional design; and the infl uence of external governments over minority parties, namely Serbia. Throughout the campaign for the Albanian vote, parties posited themselves along a spectrum 47 of those parties supportive of Serb participation in the electoral process and subsequent institutions, and those who vehemently opposed any steps to encourage minority voter turnout.
On the facilitation of the election in Serb majority municipalities, and participation of Serb ethnic parties, the most moderate campaign was run by the centre-right Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës, PDK), the incumbent party led by Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi. Whether out of genuine conviction for a multiethnic, inclusive Kosovo, or as a pragmatic choice to assist the pursuit of EU integration due to pressure from international actors, the PDK made repeated public appeals for Serbs to participate in local elections. 50 Representatives of the centre-right Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK) joined with other opposition parties to condemn the proposed visits by members of the Serbian government, such as the then-Prime Minister Ivica Dačić, to Serb majority municipalities during the election campaign, arguing that this violated both regulations on political visits during the campaign period, and Kosovo's sovereignty. 51 This diff ered to the PDK, who publically welcomed the visit as an opportunity to encourage Serbs to vote. 52 The use of status-neutral ballots in the northern municipalities-an important pre-requisite for Serb voters-and visits of some Serbian offi cials to Kosovo, were vocally opposed by the nationalist party Self-Determination (Vetëvendosje, VV), who claimed that both violated the constitution, and showed that the elections were being conducted on Serbia's terms, thus threatening Kosovo's sovereignty. 53 Minority participation in Kosovo institutions, such as forming the decentralized Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM), was another identity-framed concern around which some Albanian ethnic parties mobilized. As Thaçi was a signatory to the Brussels Agreement, and the PDK had previously formed the governing coalition with the Serb-minority Independent Liberal Party (Samostalna liberalna stranka, SLS) under Kosovo's power-sharing constitution, the PDK was comparatively distinguished to majority voters as being in favour of minority integration, particularly as statements were disseminated through Albanian-language and international media outlets. However, other members of the PDK and members of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës, AAK) made negative public statements about their support for both the agreement and att empts to integrate the northern municipalities. 54 The most explicitly ethnic claims prior to the voting period were made by VV, who consistently opposed the Brussels Agreement and decentralization based on ethnicity, repeatedly arguing that the normalization process and concessions to minorities were creating a separate Serb entity in Kosovo, rather than integrating the northern municipalities. 55 Despite their opposition to an agreement which facilitated the municipal elections, VV fi elded candidates in almost all municipalities, in order to increase their power base outside of the parliament. 56 Mobilization of Serb ethnic parties, and the election campaign in Serb majority areas, was divided between parties which advocated voter turnout, Serb integration, and decentralization, as ways of protecting minority interests and continued habitation of Serbs in Kosovo, and a boycott movement, who violently opposed holding the election in the north, as a threat to the Serbian-supported parallel institutions in those municipalities. Parties who supported minority electoral participation were further split between those materially backed by the Serbian government like the Serb Civic Initiative (Građanska inicijativa Srpska, G. I. Srpska) and parties who had stood in previous Kosovo elections. All of their campaigns were run on an identity, rather than issue, basis, although fears of losing parallel structures in the north was driven in part by material fears of losing employment and subsidies provided by the Serbian state.
Open and preferential treatment of G. I. Srpska by the Serbian government meant that it dominated the campaign for Serb votes. The party was dogged by accusations of being a proxy for Serbia's territorial claims over Kosovo, 57 and of hoping to form the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/ CSM) as a disruptive federal entity, replicating Republika Srpska's behaviour in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 58 There were also widespread allegations of intimidation towards Serbs, particularly in Parteš and Štrpce, to vote for G. I. Srpska, or worsening welfare as a result of severed economic support from the Serbian state. 59 G. I. Srpska's campaign revolved around negatively mobilizing Serbs to vote across Kosovo in order to block Albanian candidates from winning mayoral and deputy seats in Serb majority areas, which did nothing to challenge Albanian claims that participation of Serbs in the election threated Kosovo's sovereignty, especially when these calls were echoed by Serbian government offi cials. 60 Campaigning on a more positive-integrationist platform was the Independent Liberal Party (SLS), who, as mentioned had already served as a minority coalition member in the Kosovo government, and had a record of participating in Kosovo institutions. The Civic Initiative 'Serbia, Democracy, Justice' (Građanska inicijativa 'Srbija, demokratija, Pravda', GI-SDP) also mobilised around supporting Serb integration, but they claimed that participation was possible without recognising Kosovo's independence, 61 aligning with G. I. Srpska's strategic integration approach.
The most extreme Serb mobilization against the elections was orchestrated by a boycott movement in the north, who used sabotage of election materials and intimidation tactics to dissuade Serbs from voting. They argued that to participate would legitimize Pristina's rule, eff ectively end parallel structures of governance from Belgrade in the north, and therefore cede the four municipalities to Kosovo. 62 As stated by one Serb offi cial in Mitrovica North, 'no one here wants Kosovo institutions. We, who boycott hope the Serbian institutions will survive, and the ones who vote hope that they will keep Serbian institutions that way.' 63 Turnout across Kosovo for the fi rst round of municipal elections was 46.31%, and 46.34% for the mayoral elections, 64 an encouraging result for those hoping to prove that Kosovo could successfully conduct elections with minimal support from the international community, as the elections were organised by Kosovo's Central Election Commission, aside from the OSCE's facilitation of elections in the four northern municipalities. In three of the Serb majority municipalities in the north, turnout in the fi rst round was far lower than the national average, at 25.6%, 65 and a rerun was required at thirty polling stations. This was due to violent att acks on several polling stations on Election Day, when masked men threatened voters, destroyed and stole ballot boxes, forcing the vote to be suspended. 66 Voting was repeated at three polling stations in Zvečan and twentyseven polling stations in Mitrovica North on 17 November 2013. 67 Meanwhile the high turnout for the fi rst round in other Serb majority municipalities south of the Ibar was unprecedented, averaging 59.15%. 68 The turnout for the rerun in Mitrovica North on 17 November remained stable at 25.26%, 69 despite the risk of repeated violence from those opposed to the elections. This level of participation in Serb majority municipalities is signifi cant, due to the risk of intimidation for citizens who turned out to vote for a second time. In addition to these reruns, the second rounds of voting were held in twenty-fi ve of the thirty-eight municipalities on 1 December, to determine mayoral results, most of which were conducted peacefully. 70 The elections saw a number of incumbents unseated, with the PDK, LDK, and the AAK all losing some municipalities. Although the PDK won the largest number of mayoral seats and members of municipal councils, they lost several mayoral seats to the LDK in the second round, with this result interpreted as an 'anti-PDK vote', rather than support for LDK policies. 71 Vetëvendosje unseated the LDK's mayor in Pristina, marking their increasing popularity in recent years as a protest movement. 72 These results could suggest that whilst the local election campaigns were dominated by ethnopolitical rhetoric and identity claims over institutions, a portion of electorate chose to hold the PDK to account for their dire record on employment, economic growth, and corruption.
In the Serb-majority municipalities, Belgrade's support for G. I. Srpska paid off , with the list winning the highest number of councilor seats than any of their competitors, and the mayoral seats of nine municipalities. 73 Although this result was positive for both the Serbian and Kosovo governments, as it demonstrated Belgrade's commitment to the implementation of aspects of the Brussels Agreement, G. I. Srpska's alleged corrupt and unfair campaign practices raises the question of Serbia's commitment to democratically and transparently facilitating local decision-making over the mandates of both the agreement and the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM). However, the signifi cant turnout of voters across Serb municipalities in the presence of insecurity can be interpreted as preliminary acceptance of the Brussels Agreement and the future of their participation within Kosovo institutional structures by parts of the Serb community, for a plurality of reasons, and the boycott movement's failure to maintain the status quo of parallel governance. The seriousness of violent intimidation, however, and the theft of ballot boxes and voter lists, should not be underestimated, as citizens' ability to cast their vote safely and confi dentially is a core standard for successful, free and fair elections, something which was not guaranteed for voters in the north.
Fears over the nature of the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM) continued to dominate public debate, particularly as it was due to be formed in December 2013, dependant on Serb participation in the local polls. These concerns were stoked by statements by the G. I. Srpska mayor-elect of Mitrovica North, Krstimir Pantić, who declared that 'We have won nine municipalities, where Serb citizens will never recognise the independence of Kosovo'. 74 In January he refused to sign the mayoral pledge due to the use of Kosovo state symbols on the document, which he claimed violated the status neutral require- ment of the Brussels Agreement. This was interpreted by some analysts as an example of how Belgrade-backed offi cials could spoil institutional proceedings, 75 whilst others questioned the willingness of the government to truly integrate Serbs in the north, and argued that the situation could have been avoided. 76 Majority elite concerns over minority participation in institutions and electoral processes returned to the agenda immediately following the election. Following G. I. Srpska's success, ethnic representation in municipal institutions and the potential for Serb parties to build on these results at future elections, prompted a dispute over the proposed extension of the system of reserved seats for minorities in the Kosovo Assembly. The PDK supported a proposal from all minority community parties to extend the reserved seat system, which was due to run out at the end of the current legislative term, leaving the guaranteed seats for minorities in place. 77 This was opposed by the main Albanian opposition parties; the LDK denied ever agreeing to support this measure, 78 and the Deputy Prime Minister Edita Tahiri argued that reserved seats were unnecessary, as 'We have been very generous toward minority communities especially towards Serbs'. 79 This discourse of zero-sum resource sharing, and limits to minority accommodation, is a continuation of the pre-election Albanian elite campaign rhetoric, extended from minority participation in the electoral process to ethnic plurality of institutions. Whilst the elections marked a turning point in minority participation, the success of VV in Pristina laid the groundwork for ethnic issues, in particular the reserved seats, decentralisation and the normalisation process to remain as prominent debates before the scheduled parliamentary elections in 2014.
Electoral Study: National Elections in Kosovo
Early parliamentary elections for the 120 seats of the unicameral chamber Kosovo Assembly were held on 8 June 2014, using an open list and proportional representation system across all thirty-eight municipalities. The election was called following the government's failure to form a Kosovo Armed Forces from the current Kosovo Security Forces, as Serb MPs-whose vote was required to pass the legislation as an issue of vital interest to minority communities-refused to vote for the act, unless the reserved seat system of minority representation was reinstated. 80 This resistance represented both Serbs' opposition to the establishment of such a force, and the mobilization of minorities against the constitutionally-scheduled change into a guaranteed seat system of minority participation in the Assembly, which minority parties feared would reduce the number of seats available to them without the need to compete or reach the 5% threshold. 81 The 2014 national polls, such as with the 2013 local elections, held signifi cance for Kosovo's development as a post-communist, multiethnic democracy. The June elections marked the fi rst parliamentary polls since the 2008 declaration of independence to be held across the entire territory of Kosovo, 82 again with voting in the four northern municipalities facilitated by the OSCE on behalf of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kosovo (CEC), and international pressure on both Pristina and Belgrade to encourage Serb participation. On the 6 May Kosovo's formal negotiations with the EU on the SAA were concluded, demonstrating the European Commissioner for Enlargement's satisfaction with the conduct of local elections, and Pristina's continued commitment to the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, rather than compelling progress in implementing required reforms. 83 Another similarity with the local elections is that analysis of party campaigns and the main issues under contention is most eff ectively done by examining the contests for majority and non-majority votes respectively. The reasons for this are twofold; fi rstly, as with the 2013 campaign, almost all candidates adhered to ethnic cleavage by appealing exclusively to their own linguistic communities; 84 secondly, the participation of Serb minority parties during the campaign period diff ered from that of all other political entities.
A signifi cant diff erence from the local elections was a shift from identitybased campaigns to issue-based platforms by Albanian majority parties. After governing Kosovo with four smaller coalition partners since 2008, the polls were a chance for voters to hold the incumbent PDK accountable for Kosovo's slow economic growth, high unemployment, and widespread corruption. Aware of this, candidates from all mainstream Albanian parties focused on issues such as investment and job creation, rather than att empting to mobilize the electorate over concerns about Serb minority inclusion. Both the PDK and LDK campaigned on economic platforms, with pledges to stimulate wages, create jobs, and increase social welfare, and the AAK also raised the endemic spread of corruption under the PDK. 85 Mobilization along ethnic concerns was not entirely absent, however, as discourses of minorities' roles in Kosovo institutions and ownership of the state by a titular nation still featured in the statements made by Albanian party members prior to the election. The PDK unsuccessfully att empted to convince the LDK and VV to support the extension of reserved minority seats, in exchange for Serb votes for the Kosovo Armed Forces, 86 and continued to make positive statements regarding minority participation in elections and state security structures. 87 Once again, this inclusive approach towards minorities was constructed as an act of generosity by the majority, conditioned on behaviour and performance; Kosovo's Minister of European Integration, Bekim Çollaku (PDK), stated that 'ultimately, we expect from them [Kosovo Serbs] to be constructive and make on contribution [sic] not only to promote the rights of their community, but also help to strengthen Kosovo institutions'. 88 Majority fears over Serb infl uence in the Kosovo Assembly were also expressed through pre-election opposition to reserved seats for minorities by Albanian opposition parties. The LDK continued their opposition to extending this system, whilst maintaining that the party supported integration of Serbs in Kosovo and the normalization dialogue with Belgrade. 89 This contradiction is explained by the implicit rationale for the LDK's problem with reserved seats; that following the turnout of Serb voters in the 2013 local elections, Serbs could achieve enough seats in the assembly to give them the deciding vote in the likely negotiations to form a coalition government. Given the PDK's coalition with the minority Serb SLS, and their record of publically supporting minority integration, it was unlikely that the LDK would benefi t from an increased number of Serb MPs. Accordingly, VV's concern over the possible post-election coalition was rooted in the long-term belief that Serb MPs would be infl uenced by Belgrade politicians. They claimed that the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (A/CSM) was an att empt to achieve a 'Greater Serbia', 90 also repeating the zero-sum claim that positive discrimination for minorities was causing discrimination against Albanians in state institutions. 91 Minority Serb mobilization in 2014 revolved around issues of inclusion and access to representation, with the dissolution of intra-ethnic Serb competition by the formation of a unifi ed Serbian List (Srpska Lista). Having failed to prevent the termination of the reserved seat system, Serb parties' pre-election discontent spilled over into the campaign period. Following the CEC's decision that Kosovo state symbols would appear on all election materials, and that Serbs could not participate in polling station committ ees south of the Ibar, Serbian List representatives froze election activities and threatened to boycott , arguing that the use of such symbols violated the status-neutrality of the Brussels Agreement. 92 A last minute intervention from Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić resolved the stand-off , as he instructed Serbs in Kosovo to vote, stipulating that local mayors could not decide to boycott unless it had previously been agreed with Belgrade. 93 This statement, and the subsequent resumption of campaign activities by Serbian List in the south, was a further indication that Serb leaders in Kosovo do not simply look to Belgrade for guidance; instead the level of domestic Serb engagement with Kosovo institutions is dictated from outside. Additionally, whilst Serb voters in 2013 were choosing whether or not to endorse the principles of the Brussels agreement and accept the transfer of some competencies from the Serbian state to Kosovo institutions, the dominance of Serbian List, and the control exercised over this party by Belgrade, made the quality of choice in the national elections questionable. 94 The results of the national elections, far from resolving the Assembly's impasse, led to an unprecedented constitutional and parliamentary crisis which left the country in a political impasse when the parliament did not meet for almost six months. Nevertheless, the conduct of the elections was markedly more successful than the local elections in 2013, without a repeat of the violent incidents in Serb-majority municipalities. Turnout for the elections at the national level slightly improved on the previous year's local elections, as turnout across Kosovo averaged 42.63%, 95 despite the short campaign period. Once again turnout was lower in the northern municipalities, where the average turnout was 25.97%, compared to the average turnout of 47.50% in the southern Serb-majority municipalities. 96 This can be att ributed to the freeze of campaigning in the north, and their passive participation following the decision not to boycott . Despite the fewer incidents of fraud and voter intimidation across Kosovo, compared to the widespread electoral fraud of the 2010 national polls, citizen confi dence in the accuracy of the voter list remained low, particularly due to the remaining presence of 500,000 non-residents of Kosovo on this list. 97 The performance of the main Albanian parties was a minor improvement on the 2010 national elections, with the PDK, LDK, Vetëvendosje all wining several more parliamentary seats, and the AAK keeping their existing number of seats. 98 Initially the PDK were declared the victors, with its pre-election coalition receiving 30.38% of the vote, 99 and voter opinion of their previous mandate apparently positive. However, this success was short-lived, as each of the PDK's potential coalition partners, the LDK, AAK and the newly created Initiative for Kosovo party (Nisma për Kosovën, NISMA), formed a majority coalition, in an att empt to prevent the PDK from retaining power. VV off ered their position as the third largest party in parliament to this new bloc, and despite their opposition to the constitutional requirement of Serb representatives in the government of Kosovo and demands to suspend the Brussels Agreement, which would have made their participation in a governing coalition untenable, the off er was accepted. 100 Subsequent confusion regarding the constitutional stipulations on pre-and post-election coalitions, and the competencies of the Constitutional Court and the President in such situations, prevented either bloc from developing a government, or repeating the elections. In December 2014 the PDK and LDK established a grand coalition by achieving a majority with the required inclusion of Serbian List MPs, 101 thus ending the impasse, and consolidating the representation of Belgrade-backed MPs in the government of Kosovo. This post-election politicking was a major test for the eff ectiveness of institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, to resolve the complexities of a power-sharing system which must guarantee minority participation, and the democratic maturity of political elites in Kosovo.
The performance of Serbian List confi rmed minority parties' pre-election concerns they would not achieve more than the guaranteed number of seats under the reserved seats system. Despite the awareness that their acquiescence was necessary to support a governing coalition, they did not present any conditions of electoral reform of the minority seat system. Their cooperation during the coalition-forming process was supported by Belgrade; leader of the Serbian Assembly Milovan Drecun maintained that Serb MPs did not need to recognize the status of Kosovo institutions, 'but they need to be part of them so that they can raise the voice of Kosovo Serbs, prevent discrimination against them, and contribute to the return of all Serb IDPs'. 102 The statement highlights the pragmatic need for minority representation in political institutions and accommodation of the minority by the ethnic majority, but also raises again the infl uence of the Serbian government over Serbian List MPs. Serb voters' acceptance of the diminished plurality of ethnic parties indicates that rather than being a positive vote for Kosovo institutions, Serb participation in the national elections shows a determination to continue being governed from Belgrade, without damaging Serbia's EU aspirations through the persistence of parallel institutions. Whether Serb participation in Kosovo's subsequent government genuinely represents the needs of the local Serb community, or acts as a destabilizing proxy for Belgrade, remains to be seen. Serb participation in the 2014 elections, and the focus on socioeconomic issues by majority parties, indicates that whilst there was a slight move away from the identity based politicking of 2013, the continuation of both majority and minority ethnopolitical mobilization means that the normalization of electoral politics is still an ongoing process in Kosovo.
Conclusions
Our paper has discussed the impact of the ethnic cleavage on both the normative and practical support of political agendas, which catapult ethnopolitical entrepreneurs into offi ce. The principles and practices of democratic accountability of a party and the alternative accountability of parties allowed us to generate a dynamic account of transformations of ethnopolitical agendas in this ethnically divided society over the course of two elections. This was primarily done through the lens of political parties experiencing, but also causing, those changes by making domestic policy choices explicit in the light of their constituent country, as well as of their external homeland's aspirations to foster closer relationships with the EU during the electoral campaign. We identify the distinctive features of ethnopolitical mobilization in the form of horizontal-informal intra-ethnic agreements, and vertical-formal competition between diff erent political parties representing distinct ethnic constituencies.
Our overview of electioneering and outcomes of two recent elections in Kosovo provided us with the opportunity to evaluate electorates' perceptions of the proposed set up of democratic institutions and policies put forward by competing ethnopolitical forces. In democratizing states particularly, electoral cycles provide a clear cut picture of public appreciation of the direction, dynamics and successes in elites' att achment to 'tribal politics'. Alternatively, we have witnessed some preparedness of Albanian and Serb ethnopolitical entrepreneurs to push through novel political norms, support the newly installed regime and commit to competing political, rather than ethnic agendas.
Until the elections in 2013, the political landscape in Kosovo saw a great deal of ethnopolitical entrepreneurship and the success of ethnically defi ned parties. Specifi cally, we have seen the reelection of the leading parties or government led-coalitions, the consolidation of long-time smaller parties into larger political conglomerates, and increasingly the emergence of parties and coalitions representing ethnically heterogeneous electorates. While this trend was observable in the run up to elections of 2013, in this paper we have showed how electoral politics has coped with these changes following the 2014 National Assembly elections.
If anything, the participation of Serb voters in these elections makes it painfully clear that in Kosovo, as in most states, existence of democratic political institutions alone does not make the political system a fully functioning democracy. Public support expressed by casting an electoral ballot therefore, has been diff erentiated into two broad categories: normative and practical. The normative level addresses the principle ideas about the social decision-making process as is mediated through political institutions of the state in whose political life citizens take part. The practical aspect refl ects the issues which require correctives in policy, adjustments in the focus of governments, and ultimately parties' profi ling.
On the other side of the ballot box, electoral politics force political elites to draw up the balance sheet and identify their goals by outlining policy priorities, and as such challenge the political programs of their competitors, which in the case of Serb ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, also includes political institutions of the state of Kosovo. In situations where the population is poor, government is weak, and the degree of ethnonational fractionalization is high, electoral politics turn into interethnic contests for control over limited resources for political redistribution of power. In a nutshell, our observed elections have forced voters to decide upon the competency of political representatives to deliver change or ensure stability of provisional political institutions in Kosovo in a way corresponding to expectations of the public casting the ballot. However, the conduct of these elections demonstrates that whilst voters have this decision-making capacity, low turnouts, the presence of fraud, and signifi cant pressure to vote from external actors, all point to electoral politics which still suff er from a defi cit of democratic norms and practices. Meanwhile, the limited change of incumbents in elections lauded as historic, suggests that accountability of political elites is not the highest priority for voters in Kosovo.
Regarding aspirations for Kosovo to become a member of the EU, stemming from both domestic and European elites, successful conduct of elections is considered a critical step of democracy consolidation on the path to accession. This is entrenched both by the formal accession requirements but also by the conclusions of the EU's Election Observation Mission's reports after both the 2013 and 2014 polls, which emphasized the contribution of the 'successful' elections to Kosovo's development as a democracy, whilst simultaneously reporting the intraethnic nature of campaigning and incidents which hindered free and fair participation of segments of the electorate. 103 The ethnopolitical dynamics of the two elections studied here demonstrate another example of what Agarin and Cordell refer to as post-communist elites' responses to EU requirements for change: namely, that 'form has been confused with content'. 104 Furthermore, having achieved the basic standard of multiethnic, competitive elections across all municipalities in Kosovo, such form has been publically welcomed by representatives of European institutions, regardless of the realities of electoral conduct, and despite offi cial European Commission reports which highlight the need for electoral reform. 105 The purpose of this paper was not to discuss enlargement fatigue of existing EU member states and Kosovo's prospects of future membership, as this is covered elsewhere by a large tract of literature. Our study of these electoral dynamics, however, further adds to work which is skeptical of the progress for inclusion of minorities in Kosovo's post-confl ict institutions and the processes by which these institutions develop. These processes cannot be considered independently of the context of European norm promulgation and practices, and the various ways that domestic entrepreneurs in Kosovo, as within other post-communist states, have interpreted them.
As Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer point out, political institutions constitute nothing more than 'the hardware' of representative democracy. 106 To operate, this hardware requires the suitable 'software' understandable to and accepted by the society it governs. Both the scholarly community and policy circles recognize that what political elites make of democratic institutions and institutional opportunity structure is a key component of such software. The software installation process is incomplete until the matt ers aff ecting all voters regardless of their ethnic, social and economic backgrounds are intrinsically linked to stable political institutions. Citizen participation in choosing political representatives to sit in the government that is sett ing, implementing, and monitoring legal standards, and mediating intergroup confl icts through nascent political institutions, is pivotal. Only when an overwhelming majority of the elected representatives unconditionally supports democratic procedures, plays by the rules of democratic game and is accountable to all citizens of the state, and not only to the co-ethnics, should we consider the software to be running eff ectively on the hardware of Kosovo, democratic political institutions.
